This paper investigates the actuality of structuralism in its relaüonship with cognitive semanocs. It does so through a trajectory that begins with Peirce's Logic of Relatives, then Tesniere's and Greimas' actantial syntax are considered with respect to dynamic semiotics and Frege's chemistry of concepts, ending in cognitive semiotics. The articie argues for the complete compatibility of Peirce's semiotics with a structuralist epistemology, of which the Logic of Relatives antidpates some fundamental traits. A Peirce-inspired intetpretative semiotics has often been opposed to structural and generative semiotics. This is not necessarily the case. Through passages from Peirce, Tesniere, Greimas and dynamic semiotics works, unsuspected echoes and correspondences are unveiled, but a crucial divergence also comes to light. The different authors share a conception of the sentence as grounded on purely relational positions, called relatives or correlates (Peirce), actants (Tesniere) and proto-actants (Greimas). Peirce considers the primitive relatives as triads (the model of "A gives B to C") from which dyads can be generated. Contrarily, the Greimasian development of structuralism decomposes actantial structures into primitive dyads ("A renounces to B" and "C receives B"), thus breaking the structural balance that constitutes the topological and relational Gestalten on which the Logic of Relatives and actantial syntax are grounded. Indeed, those Gestalten are not reducible to conjunctions and disjunctions of algebraic inspiration, or to a conceptual chemistry inspired by logic (as in Frege): this is the reason why Peirce's and Tesniere's structural theories have prompted a great interest in dynamic semiotics. Moreover, through their semio-linguistic specificity, these models still allow us to investigate the heritage of structuralism, and situate it within a cognitive semiotic perspective.
In a controversial yet fundamental essay from 1892 , Peirce insists on the idea that the anti-Cartesian essays from 1867 were just the first part of a wider theory called "theory of the continuum", or sjnechism-, a theory which Peirce was finally able to define in its specificities.^ In Greek, aw/jx^iv means "to keep together" or "to connect"^, and "synechism" names the philosophical doctrine of "connecting" and "making the parts continuous" (cp. MS 945 and CP 7.565). Peirce states that the fundamental principle of synechism is that our thoughts are connected to each other in the same way that they are connected to their objects, and objects of the world are connected to each other in the same way as thoughts and their objects (cp. CP 6.277, 6.202) . With synechism, Peirce individuates not a metaphysical principle, but a cognitive form of relation,'' which in 1867 he sought to identify with the principle of valid inference. The meaning of this identification, and consequendy the relation between semiotics and logic in Peirce, can only be understood through the principle of valid inference itself.
The Publishing of Peirce's previously unavailable manuscripts leaves no room for doubt: a valid inference is a funcdon of the unity between premises and conclusion; and it has a structure that can be divided into diree fundamental species (Deducrion, Inducoon, and Hypothesis), each unifying in its own way the different propositions of an argument (W2: [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] . Although every single kind of reasoning has its own peculiar specificity, there is a common ground for any inference (CP 5.278) : in every argument the conclusion mll almofs be a sign of the premises (and vice versa) (W2: 25, CP 5.279). This semiodc form of relation is exacdy the same form of relation that will be defined by Peircean synechism and used as a foundation for Peircean theory entirely. Consequendy, the cognidve structure of valid inference is defined by its semiodc natura. Indeed, in Deducrion, Hypothesis, and Inducdon, the conclusion will always be a Symbol, an icon, or an index of the premises. In reladon to this structure, Peirce will always be able to State the semiodc nature of logic.
The semiodcity mendoned above also depends on the nature of Peircean logic, pardcularly on the nature of the Peircean Logic of Reladves. The semiodc tradidon has not generally understood that Peircean logic itself has undergone a series of radical transformadons, which are not reducible to a neo-posidvist, or even just tnith-condidonal, concepdon of logic. The theory of inference used as a foundadon for the semiodc deducrion of categories and for the semioric gnoseology of the and-Cartesian essays from 1867 was already grounded on an absolutely original idea: in the conrinuous stream of thought, posirions had to be individuated that could be related in a premises-conclusion semioric relarion. Only then would it have been possible to establish the correspondence between the three kinds of inferences and the logical figures of Aristotelian syllogism ). Nevertheless, the exegesis of Peirce focused only on the construcrion of a logical table, completely ignoring the method through which it was built, a method that used semioric theory as the foundarion for the logical relarions of premises and conclusion. Beginning with his theory of inference from the 1860's, Peirce used a semiodc topology as the foundarion for its logic, consriturively based on the demonstrarion of four incapaciries and on the deducrion of some of its consequences. Since we do not have any kind of introspecrion, any concept of the absolutely unknowable, and are incapable of thinking without signs, we need to divide the continuous stream of thoughts and individuate posirions in it that are reciprocally defined through a semioric and triadic relarion (cp. CP 5.318-5.357).
This topological mechanism is even more radical in the Logic of Relatives, where an absolute epistemological shift happens, through which any potential gap between Peircean logic and structural semiotics is bridged. Here Peirce develops a differential analysis of the possible relations that structure the topology of any proposition, an analysis that constitutively precedes the study of the inferences, enunciates, and relations between them (cp. Burch 1991) . This truly innovative form of topological logic is also consdtutively founded on the verbal valence and on the number of places opened by a node around which the relations are organised.
As we will see in the following paragraphs, it is this exact same method that eighty years later Lucien Tesniere will use, and that even later Greimas will use as a foundation for his actanüal narrative syntax (Greimas 1970 (Greimas , 1983 . A proper understanding of Peirce's Logic of Relatives leads to awareness of the fact that founding semiotics on logic means exactly founding it on a differential actantial syntax, whose nature is relational and structural. Peirce's I^gic of Relatives is barely related to Camap's or Frege's logic, while it is deeply related to the Hjelmslev's and Tesniere's logic. It is exactly with Tesniere's structural syntax that Peirce's Logic of Relatives shows not only unsuspected correspondences, but also a substantial identity that goes beyond terminological differences (cp. Askedal 1996) .
The true history of the actant
Let US take a closer look. The Greimasian notion of actant comes from the stance against all of the logical-philosophical tradition that has always used the relation of subject-predicate as the centre of the analysis of the proposition:
The Opposition of subject and predicate, makes impossible to distinguish the structural balance of the sentence, because it brings the analyst to isolate one of the actants as a subject, excluding the others and pushing them inordinately in the predicate with the verb and the circumstants.
That means to assign to one of the elements of the sentence too much importance, while no Linguistic element justifies that.
On the contrar)'
the Opposition of the subject and the predicate introduces an asymmetf}' factor, because each actant is on a different level according to its being or not the subject. On the contrary, in the sentence Alfredgves the hook to Carl, Carl and also the book, while not directly acting, are anyway actants in the same way as Alfred (Tesniere 1959: 76, 73 ).
However, "starong from his Logic of Relatives in 1870, Peirce decides to abandon that millennial logical tradition that chose the relation between the subject and the predicate as the centre of the proposition and that inspired his essay 'On a New List of Categories'":^ We consider the tendency of the subject/nominative as an unfortunate habit of cur race or, maybe as a mysterious instinct, just like the wasps take care of their own eggs. (...) But logic, which duty consists in determining the necessary profjerties of signs, does not have any reason to consider, for instance, the fact of giving as belonging more to the giver than to the receiver or to the gift (...] So in a triadic fact, say, for example A gives B to C, we make no distinction in the ordinary logic of relations between the subject nominative, the direct object, and the indirect object. |...] If we call A, B, C, D four subjects of the proposition and 'sells _ to _ for the price of_' a predicate, we represent the logical relation, well enough, but we abandon the Aryan syntax (MS 200: 59, MS 308, MS 595: 27) .
The reference to the "Aryan syntax" is really important: at the time where he was writing these lines, Peirce was studying languages, and in particular he was studying languages which are not based on the "subject-predicate" structure. This reminds us of Nietzsche, who would say that every westem philosophical problem comes from the "subject-predicate" structure of our language. And that is a major problem. Saying that a sentence like Alfred speaks involves only two Clements means analysing it in a superficial way, a purely morphological one, and neglecting the essential dement, which is the syntactic bind. In chemistry, we have an analogous phenomenon: the combination of chlorine (Cl) and of sodiuin (Na) generates a Compound, cooking salt or sodium chloride (NaCl), which is a completely different substance and has completely different features from bodi chlorine and sodium (Tesniere 1959: 30) .
Here is another turning point: substance is the result of a combination of relations and not something which has different features on its own that can be predicated by a subject. Just like chemical elements present a valence -the number of atoms able to combine with the considered element -different kinds of verbs in the proposidon will also present such a valence, which in this case consists in the number of positions which can be filled out by terms able to combine with the considered verb. In Tesniere, those terms determined by the function of the verbal valence are actants, and in accordance with the chemical analogy, the verb ends up determining a node -a set made up by the regent (verb) and by all the subordinates depending from it -"that keeps the whole together" (Tesniere 1959: 31) . This is interesting, because "just as 19th Century chemists leamed to classifyelements according to valence or the number of open bonding sites on the atom, Peirce classifies relatives, the relational elements of a proposidon, according to the number of open places for inserdon of an indexical sign"^:
A chemical atom is quite like a relative in having a definite number of loose ends or "unsaturated bonds", corresponding to the blanks of the relative. In a chemical molecule, each loose end of one atom is joined to a loose end, which it is assumed must belong to some other atom, [...] The proposition "John gives John to John" corresponds in its Constitution, as Figs. 1 and 2 show, precisely to ammonia. Thus, it becomes piain that every node of bonds is equivalent to a relative; and the doctrine of valence is established for us in logic cp. 1.289, 1.346, 3.421, 4.309, 4.561nl, 5.469) . 7 Parker 1992: 121.
Relative terms are pure posiüons defined according to verbal valence, and Peirce often uses a notation that defines diem as white spaces disseminated by the structure of the sentence, like for instance in the case of the gift: "_ gives _ to _" 3.471, MS 595) . In diis way, die Logic of Relatives is nothing but a very original form of topology of the proposition,® in which the Classification of the elements depends on the number of positions available to insert a new term. In Tesniere, these terms are named actants (proto-actants in Greimas, positional actants in Fontanille), whüe in Peirce they are called relative terms (or correlates).'
We should note the constitutive differential nature of these terms in which the elements do not exist except in a reciprocal relation:
[Relatives are] shadows combining together to form a substance! They are things that do not exist.
They have no existence in the universe of quantity. But joined together in sets, they do. They are just like chemical radicals, each having a certain number of unsatisfied wants. When each of these is satisfied by union with another, the completely saturated whole has an existence in the universe of quantity [...] The application of this idea to logic gives the exact logic of relatives (NEM IV: 151-152).
Here we are again: substance is an effect of combination. Thus, Peircean relatives are actants and their identity is purely relational. Their constitutively differential nature defines the conditions of possibility of any kind of successive logical process. In this way, any kind of potential gap between a Peircean semiotic logic and a structuralist relational differentiality is bridged. But to be precise, we should say exacdy the opposite: Tesnierian actants are relative terms, their identity is purely relational, and their constitutively differential nature defines the conditions of the possibility of any kind of successive narrative process. In this way, any kind of potential gap between a structuralist relational differenriality and a Peircean semiotic logic is bridged. In CP 4.5, Peirce defines die consdtutive originality of die Logic of Relatives as a movement from the concept of class to that of system,'" a movement that is analogous to the one developed by Louis Hjelmslev in bis extraordinary Resume of a Theo^ ofluinguage,^^ with only terminological differences:
the ordinary logic has a great deal to say about genera and species, or in our nineteenth Century dialect, about classes. Now, a class is a set of objects comprising all that stand to one another in a special relation of similarity. But where ordinary logic talks of classes the logic of relatives talks of systems. A system is a set of objects comprising all that stand to one another in a group of connected relations (CP 4.5).
To give an account of tbese groups of interconnected relations that define a system, Peirce gives, in various passages, several examples of verbs with different valences: for instance, "it rains" has a zero valence; "A is a man" has a one valence, "A kills B" has a two valence and "A gives B to C" has a three valence. This we can also leam reading Tesniere. According to the valence of the verb, there will be predicates with zero actants ("it rains" is considered a process "that happens by itself, without any person or things participating in it"); with a single actant ("A falls") with two actants ("A beats B") or with three actants ("A gives B to C") (cp. Tesniere 1959: 79-83) . The correspondences between the two texts are so evident that they do not need any further emphasis; except perhaps on a theoretical level, where they both imply a change of perspective:
-From the "subject-predicate" structure to that of "verbal valence". -From a "substance-based" theory to one based on relation.
-From an "inclusion into classes" model to that of a "system of connected relations".
We will now show the foUowing: i) how Peircean semiotics, from a certain moment, is grounded on a strucmral Logic of Relatives, in which the relation 10 About the decisive importance of this passage, that represents an authenüc shift in Peircean conceptions and means a consdtutive shift from the theory of "On a New Ust of Categories", cp. consdtutes the identity of the terms; ii) how the Peircean structuring of the Lx)gic of Relatives allows us to re-think some key concepts of contemporary semiotics, like narrarivity, in a more heurisüc way; iii) how a non-logical topological and relational approach like those of Peirce and Tesniere have been looked at with great interest by tfie authors of the so-called dynamic semiotics, inspired by Rene Thom's works; iv) how notwithstanding some superficial assonances and the common metaphor of the chemical valence, Peirce's Logic of Relatives and Tesniere's actantial syntax differ substantially firom Frege's very famous logical pages on the "chemistry of concepts"; v) how Peirce's and Tesniere's reflections can be conjugated with some research trajectories already in act in cognitive semiotics.
Logic of Relatives and Interpretative Semiotics; Structural Syntax and Generative Semiotics: firom Tesniere-Peirce to dynamic semiotics through Greimas and Frege
In Order to throw light on the relationship between Logic and Semiotics in Peircean thought, let us ask ourselves what is the relationship between Semiotics and this particular topology of proposition called Logic of Relatives. According to Peirce's thought after the foundation of the logic of relatives, semiotics is part of a more general logic of relations, a part that has the task of studying a very particular kind of relation called semiosis. What then is semiosis for Peirce, if semiosis is the object of semiotics?
By "semiosis" I mean |...] an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a Cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs (CP 5.484).
Specifying that "Correlate" is nothing but the "relative term" of a relation (cp. CP 3.466), Peirce can thus write:
A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a representa-men of which some interpretant is a Cognition of a mind. Signs arc the only representamens that have been much studied (CP 2.242). A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation t« its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic relation in which the Third stands be merely similar to that in which the First stands, for this would make the relation of the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness merely. The Third must indeed stand in such a relation, and thus must be capable of determining a Third of its own; but besides that, it must have a second triadic relation in which the Representamen, or rather the relation thereof to its Object, shaU be its own (the Third's) Object, and must be capable of determining a Third to this relation. All this must equaUy be true of the Third's Thirds and so on endlessly; and this, and more, is involved in the familiar idea of a Sign; and as the term Representamen is here used, nothing more is implied. Indeed, it is certainly true that the Peircean semiorics is a part of his Logic of Relatives, but it is equally true that semiorics is the most fundamental part of it, so fundamental that it ends up being confiised with it, since the three theorems of the Logic of Relatives say exacdy that:
Thus
-All the relarions with a valence above three can be reduced to combinations of triads.
-No triadic relation can be reduced to combinations of monads or dyads.
-All monadic and dyadic relarions can be generated from triadic relarions. for contemporary semiotics and we will here Start developing, as an example, their applications to the problem of narrativity.
As we have said, Peirce is really keen on the importance of triadic relations, those that have three valences, for instance "A gives B to C". This reference to giving that Peirce uses in all his examples as the prototypical triadic relation is far from alien to the semioric tradirion. It is well known that in Greimas, the aim of actanrial syntax is to define the relarion between the norion of value and its circularion inside the semiotic universe (narrativity): Greimas' problem is to describe the way values circulate and change. In this enterprise, Greimas is deeply influenced by The Gift by Marcel Mauss (1923) ,which defines a logic of the circulation of values inside a specific system. The absolutely central Position which the relative of "gift" occupies in the Peircean logic of relationsand the fact that it is at the same time structured as an actantial syntax -is too strong a hint not to lead us to develop the consequences of these suspicious coincidences. We strongly believe that actanrial syntax, a syntax of relative terms, should be founded on the fundamental theorems of the Peircean Logic of Relatives. The first and the third theorem have been developed extensively in some previous works.'"* The aim here is to develop the second theorem in relation to the problem of the gift and its actanrial structure.
A triad represents something more than a simple sum of couples. For instance: A gives B to C. We have three couples: A gives B away, C receives B, A enriches C. But these three dual events even if considered together do not constitute the triplicity of the fact, which is made up by the following: that A gives B away, C receives B, A cnriches C, but all in a unique act (MS 717, cp. also CP 8.331).
As noted correctly by Gallie (1952: 112) : "The irreducibility of the triadic relations is due to the fact that, for example, an event like A gives B to C cannot be decomposed in the two events 'A renounces to B' and 'C receives B', because a similar relation of events with two terms would overlook the characteristic unity of intents that differentiates an act of gift from an accidental change of property. Analogous considerations are valid for events like 'A points B to C, 'A suggests B to C and, more generally 'A means B to C". Now, this decomposition of the triad in couples of dyads is exacdy what happens in the Greimasian actanrial syntax, where the gift relarion is exacdy the one that comes from the sum of the dyadic relations of "renunciation" and "attribution" (cp. Greimas 1983: 35) . This kind of relation is what reduces the phenomenon of the gift to a series of dyadic relations: conjunction/disjunction between subjects and objects of value. These conjunctions/disjuncrions are the effect of a specific narrative program "that produces solidal renounces and attributions":'^ A is in conjunction with the object B and C is in disjunction with the same object. Then A gives B away (renounciation) giving it to C (attribution) and enters in a relation of disjunction with B, while C is now joined to it. Is relation anything more than a connection between two things? For example, can we not State that A gives B to C without using any other relational phrase than that one thing is connected with another? Let us try.
Wc have the general idea of giving. Connected with it are the general ideas of giver, gift, and "donee". We have also a particular transacoon connected with no general idea except that of giving. We have a first party connected with this transaction and also with the general idea of a giver. We have a second party connected with that transaction, and also with the general idea of "donee". We have a subject connected with that transaction and also with the general idea of a gift. A is the only hecceity direcdy connected with the first party; C is the only hecceity direcdy con- The meaning of Peirce's argumentation is clean the gift is a unitary process and its decomposition in supposed constituent units üiat present a different fonn of relation unavoidably destroys the consütutive structure of the event ("giving") in its processuality. The form of relation ("modes of relation") constitutes the identity of the considered element (the gift, in this case). Accordingly, changing the form of relation means unavoidably losing the nature of the phenomenon itself The structural nature of Peirce's Logic of Relatives, in which the relation constitutes the identity of the related terms, is evident here. As in Tesniere's actantial syntax, an evenemential conception of the proposition is able to define variable events that open certain subject positions and define a network of relations that constitute the identity of the terms at stake. This is the reason why structural actantial syntax was one of the fundamental references of a dynamic semiotics based on catastrophe theory (cp. Wildgen 1982 , Petitot 1985 , Brandt 1992 , Victorri 1996 : the events (the "giving", the "running", the "beating", the "loving", etc.) are thought as Singular points that correspond to differential relations between reciprocally determined elements. Peirce's Logic of Relatives and Tesniere's actantial syntax do not present a logical nature, but a topological and relational nature. This is the reason why their works have always been looked at with great interest by dynamic semiotics in its search for a "non-logical mathematization of the central concept of connection" (Petitot 1995 : 105, cp. Petitot 1985 . "Relation" in Peirce and "connection" in Tesniere are names for organic and irreducible semio-linguistic strucmres in which different forms of relation open to a series of positional relations that determine the identity of the elements that fill them. The systems of connections in Tesniere (stemmas) and the Relatives with their strucmres of correlates in Peirce are positional configurations with their different forms of relation (positional Gestalteri).
On the contrary, Greimas does not properly consider the purely topological and morphological nature of actantial syntax and thinks of it as reducible to binary Operations of conjunctions and disjunctions between subjects and objects of value. The notation adopted by Greimas, that uses algebra-inspired connectives, reveals the tendency to reduce a purely topological complexity -like the one of the small Tesnierian drama -to sums of dyadic relations that arc algebraically treated on die basis of the category of junction. This is the reason for which Petitot, in several important works (1985, 1992) , has strongiy argued for the necessity of a topological Interpretation of the nodon of junction, in
Order to reach a non-logical (and non-algebraic) conception of the structuralist concepts of connection and reciprocal determination (cp. Petitot 1995: 105-8).
In the same way, because of their authentically structural nature, the semio- fiinction -has a need of completion {ergän^ngsbedürfti^, that is, it has a need of one or more arguments to be saturated and assume a value. Indeed, in mathematics an argument "2" combined with a function "2x+x" enables us to form a saturated argument, that is accomplished: "4+2". It is only when this happens that the function assumes its own value ("6"). In the same way, considering the unsaturated concept-function "(x) is a bird of prey", Frege shows how the value of the enunciate will change according to the argument that will saturate it ("the eagle is a bird of prey"; "the president is a bird of prey", for example).
It is evident that the distance between the theories of Tesniere-Peirce and Frege could not be wider: i) where the first two are situated on a semiolinguistic level, the third one is situated on what is traditionally caUed a conceptual level; ii) where the first two present a topological (posidonal) configuration, the third one presents a Iogical (functional) structuring; iü) where in the first two the value of the relations defines the identity of terms, in the third one the identity of the term gives value to the enunciate inside a configuration where the relations are created between already constituted terms.
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The similarity between Peirce's and Tesniere semio-linguistic theories and Frege's logico-conceptual theory is purely extrinsic, an effect of a common metaphor -the chemical valence one -diat collects under an apparent analogy constitutively different approaches and objectives. We find at diis level a constimtive trait of structuralism on which Deleuze (1969) and Petitot (1985) have gready insisted: die epistemological enterprise of structuralism is not logical and functional, but topological and relational.
Anyway, it is the difference at point i) that enables us to tackle one last important problem that puts at its centre the actuality of structuralism in the contemporary debate.
From Structuralism to Cognitive Semiotics
Many concepts developed in cognitive semantics, for instance image-schema, have been related to the Peircean and Tesnierian notions that we have discussed here (cp. Petitot 1995: 108) . Langacker (1995) established an explicit correspondence between Tesnierian and his own notions, relating actants and participants, circumstants and settings, stemmas and image-schemas etc. This is a very important and interesting comparison that attempts a translation between paradigms. However, in our perspective it is necessary to re-state a fundamental difference: the Peircean-Tesnierian theoretical objects here discussed do not concern conceptual contents and do not have a conceptual nature at all. On the contrary, they have a purely linguistic (Tesniere) and semiotic (Peirce) nature. Furthermore, in Peirce, the semiotic level -grounded on the ideas of "community" and of "extemal mind" -constitutes the cognitive level, which can be reduced to the semiotic level, following the central argument in the second of the anti-Cartesian essay, Some Consequences of four Incapacities.
Whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a sign. [...] In other words, we must, as far as we can do so without additional hypotheses, reduce all kinds of mental action to one general tyf>e (CP 5.283, 5.266).
In his comparison with Tesniere, notwithstanding his attempt to emphasize the common traits between the two perspectives, Langacker (1995) himself notices this important difference: The difference that a Peircean-Tesnierian tradition establishes between a semiolinguistic and a conceptual level is fundamental for us and defines exactly the way in which the heritage of structuralism can he conjugated with a cognitive approach giving birth to a cognitive semiotics. In "Word Meaning" in the Cambridge Engclopaedia of the Language Snences, in order to expose the dominant contemporary perspectives, Vyvyan Evans (2007) presents as "generally accepted" the idea that:
The conventional meaning associated with a word is often referred to more technically as a semantic representation, semantic unit or lexical concept. In modern linguistics, word meanings are held to be conceptual entities, which is to say, they are held to constitute mental units, paired with phonetically-realizable forms, and stored in long-term memory. Rasüer (2001) argued how the refusal to identify the semantic with the concepmal level was die fundamental dimension in which a structuralist semiotic semantics could establish itself. Rastier showed how the reduction of the semantic level to the logical concept was at the basis of truth-conditional semantics and how the reduction of the semantic level to the gnoseological concept, or even to the psychological concept, was at the basis of the "classical Version" of cognitive semantics in the 80's and in the 90's (Rosch, Lakoff and Johnson, Talmy, Langacker etc.) . We can quote as an example Semantics and Cognition by Jackendoff: There is a unique representational level, the conceptual structure, in which linguistic, sensory and motorial informations are compatible.
For this reason to study semantics is to study cognitive psychology (Jackendoff 1983: 19 ). Langacker's attempt (1995) to assimilate Tesniere's purely linguistic concepts with his own placed on a different level, together with the attitude to diink semio-linguisüc structures eminently as "mental spaces", strongly reveal this tendency internal to the classical versions of cognitive semantics of the '80s and '90s. The unique representadonal level (the conceptual structure) in Jackendoff (1983) perfectly expresses a certain attitude to delete frontiers that we still deem as fundamental. In our perspective, like Tesniere and Peirce, we believe that there is a semio-linguistic dimension that is not reducible to the concept but that is nevertheless constitutive of semantics. We believe that is exacdy this semio-linguistic dimension that Peirce's and Tesniere's theories help us investigate.
Let US consider an example: a case of antanaclasis, "the banana is the banana". For a truth-conditional semantics, a sentence like this is a tautology and tautologies have their own problems in this perspective: they are at the very least semantically sterile, although nobody has any kind of problem in admitting that enunciates like this one are often semantically very productive. On the other hand, the concept of banana is the concept of banana and if the word "banana" fills the subject or the object position, this is not a difference that matters. Otherwise we would have the concept of banana-subject, of bananaobject, of banana-dative, of banana-vocative, etc.
The problem that a semantics has to tackle adequately is the difference between the two occurrences of the term "banana". If the first is actually a banana, the semantic value of the second is simply "something unique" or "something special" and it has nothing to do with the semantic value of the first occurrence. It is a pure position inside a determined differential level, a value inside the "small drama" of the sentence, in a way that the same semantic value can be assumed for instance by "cinema" in the sentence "cinema is cinema", or by "platypus" in the sentence "the platypus is the platypus".
Moreover, the reference to the concept does not explain the essential: there is nothing of what we can know about bananas that helps us understand and disambiguate the meaning of the second occurrence in sentences like "the banana is the banana". The description of this mechanism is essentially semiolinguistic, involving models of cases and differential semantisations of language according to established practices and conditions of enunciations.'® According to Peirce's and Tesniere's perspectives, the position of the elements in a sentence detennines dieir semantic value. The fniitfiilness of integradng a stxuctural linguistics and a cognirive semanrics can be seen at work in authors like AUwood (2003) and Evans (2006) , in which a Gase Grammar and a purely linguistic level" are shown as not reducible to, and as foundational for, a more conceptual-grounded semanrics. Similar approaches show us the benefits of what is for us an authentic cognirive semiorics, able to integrate different approaches while being aware of their differences and fronriers.
Indeed, things have been changing inside the disciplinary field called "cognirive sciences". Since Cognition is now conceived of as distributed in networks of humans and non-humans (cp. Hutchins 2001 , Sinha 1988 , meaning is detached from a traditionaily conceived conceptual level and is instead disseminated inside an encyclopaedic knowledge network acrivated by virtue of the specific context in which an element is embedded (cp. Allwood 2003 , Evans 2006 ). This perspective is perfecdy compatible and contiguous with how an encyclopaedic semantics has always been thought inside a structuralist and Peirce-inspired semiotics (cp. Eco 1984 , Violi 1997 , Paolucci 2005 . At the same time, certain works by Brandt (2005) are grounded on, and demonstrate the benefits of, re-integrating a semiotic level together with conceptual and mental levels, through the analysis of some borderline phenomena like the meaning of metaphors (cp. the notion of a "Semiotic Space" and the attention dedicated to linguistic enunciarion in Brandt and Brandt 2005) . In this way, the works of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Fauconnier and Turner (2002) are enriched by that semio-iinguisric level that in classical cognirive theories was reduced to pure conceptual perspecrives.
Contrary to what Jackendoff stated, semantics cannot be studied at a single level. Meaning is never constituted by a single system, but by a multiplicity of regulatory instances in constant interaction that evolve according to different times and ways, and that modulate semantisation according to different forces that represent the dimensions of meaning: conceptual, referenrial, textual, discursive, genre-related, related to semioric pracrices, etc. At this level, the heritage of structuralism can be fertile. We believe that the value of Peirce's and Tesniere's perspecrives is in showing the actuality of a certain approach that is already affirming itself in cognitive semiotics, and to which we wish great fortune.
